The present study explains the difference in labor militancy between the Soviet Union and Poland by examining causes and patterns of labor strikes in the two countries. Instead of attributing the difference in labor militancy between the two countries to the different conditions of "shop-floor politics," this study employs a strategy of a macro-level approach to labor strikes, and examined the association of strikes with fluctuations in workers' real consumption. On this basis, this paper attempts to capture the nature of the "social contract" between the regime and labor in the communist state. The main arguments of this paper can be summarized as follows. In both countries the primary cause of labor protests was the downfall of workers' real consumption. The primary cause of the difference in labor militancy between the two countries lay in different degrees of fluctuations in the workers' real consumption. Frustration of rising expectation such as sharp downfall of worker's real wage repeatedly led directly to regime-labor confrontations in Poland. In contrast, the Soviet leadership localized labor disputes while avoiding a sharply rising expectation among workers and by maintaining a stable increase in workers' consumption at the national level. The comparison of the two countries confirms that the legitimacy of communist rule was based mainly on the economic performance of the regime. The higher level of workers' militancy in Poland was due to the lower level of the Polish regime's economic performance i.e. the failure to keep the "social contract." The labor quiescence continued in the Soviet Union thanks to the regime's capacity to provide the workers with economic security and steady increase in the standard of living, particularly during the Brezhnev leadership.
Introduction
This paper is concerned with a different legacy of communist regimes: the difference in levels of working class militancy between the Soviet Union and Poland. In the 1960s and 1970s, the Soviet Union could maintain a peaceful industrial order without resort to totalitarian measures; labor strikes were very few and unorganized, and lasted for only one or two days; according to an estimation, the number of strike was no more than a few dozen even during a peak period in the early 1960s. 1) The Soviet workers continued to be quiescent without a significant workers' movement until coal miners struck in 1989. By contrast, we saw quite a different picture in Poland. At least four waves of massive and intense labor protest occurred and swept the country (in Poznan in June, 1956; in Szczecin-Gdynia-Gdansk in 1970-71; in Radom-Ursus in 1976; in Gdansk in 1980) . Three of them led directly to changes in regime leadership (in 1956, 1970, and 1980) . The Polish workers were eventually capable of building up Solidarity, the first independent trade union and later a social movement organization, through which the Polish workers finally obtained access to state power. What conditions produced such a difference? As an attempt to answer this question, the present paper compares the patterns of labor strikes between these two countries by examining the periods of the Brezhnev regime in the Soviet Union and the Gomulka-Gierek regimes in Poland. This paper also aims to shed some light on the nature of the "social contract" in communist state. "Social Contract" perspective assumes that the government has the responsibility to provide economic prosperity and/or political democracy in return for compliance on the part of the citizens. 2) 1) Alex Pravda (1979) "Spontaneous Workers' Activities in the Soviet Union," in Arcadius Kahan and Blair A. Ruble (eds.) Industrial labor in the USSR, New York: Pergamon Press, pp. 348-350.
2) For the "social contract" or "welfare authoritarianism" model, see George W. Breslauer (1984) "On the Adaptability of Soviet Welfare-State Authoritarianism," in Erik Hoffman and Robin F. Laird (eds.) The Soviet Polity in Modern Era, Soviet Union and Poland.
In capitalist society strike studies have been widely conducted and have identified diverse variables associated with causes of strikes. These studies can be divided into two general categories: macro-level and micro-level studies. 3) A micro-level strike analysis aims to examine causes of strikes on an industry-by-industry basis or a firm-by-firm basis. Thus, it focuses on the characteristics of firms, industry, union and other regional conditions. It is useful in explaining why an industry/firm is more vulnerable to strike than others. However, this strategy loses much of usefulness when we try to explain differences in labor militancy between the two countries with common micro-economic structures and behaviors. In fact, the state-socialist model of industrialization created almost the same industry/firm structures, behaviors of management and labor, and labor force composition in the Soviet Union and Poland. 4) Therefore, micro-level factors fail to explain the contrast between these two countries. 
4)
One difference between the two countries was that industrialization began earlier in the Soviet Union than in Poland and therefore the Soviet workers experienced more generational changes. Another difference was that the Soviet Union had a larger defense sectors (12-14 percent of GNP in the Soviet Union as compared with 3.2 percent in Poland in 1980), where the skilled workers were concentrated.
communist society excessive emphasis on investment at the expense of consumption produced widespread discontent among the workers. Furthermore, in communist societies the level of workers' real consumption fluctuated with the cycle of compromise between growth goals and consumerist pressures, which was comparable to the business cycle in capitalist society.
It has also been argued that strikes are caused mainly not by economic conditions but by political or organizational conditions. A common conclusion of the strike studies focusing on the political factors is that the capacity of inclusion/control mechanisms of labor, for example, centralized union and left party, has a significant effect on the rates of strikes. In communist societies, workers' interest articulation was channeled and controlled by social organizations including trade union as well as by the Party. Another conventional wisdom has postulated that the "civil society" played a decisive role in the creation of the Solidarity. 5)
These factors are important variables that need to be carefully examined in accounting for the working class formation. But this paper does not deal with them as it focuses only on the "cyclical pattern" of the Polish workers' massive strikes and the contrasting docility of the Soviet workers. It intends to capture the nature of "social contract" in communist societies by comparing different patterns of labor strikes at the national level.
Limitations of Micro-level "Shop-Floor Politics" Studies
Before analyzing the macro-level economic and socio-political factors, it is necessary to reevaluate the "shop-floor politics" studies as a popular micro-level approach to the study of workers in communist society. They attributed the different levels of workers' militancy in communist societies to the different configurations of shop-floor tensions in socialist firms. It seems 5) Certainly, the intelligentsia and the church were far more active in Poland than in any other communist country. However, this does not warrant that the high level of the Polish workers' militancy was due to the influence of these two factors.
that the approach exaggerated the effect of tensions at the shop-floor on workers' collective action although it captured the complex structure of labor-management relations in socialist firms.
The "shop-floor politics" studies inspired by "real socialism" model refuted an assumption of the totalitarianism model that in communist society workers were powerless and repressed without any outlet for grievances. 6) Key themes in these studies were (1) that under planned economy the workers had bargaining power vis-a-vis managers; (2) however, atomization of the workers persisted because the workers exercised the bargaining power not collectively but individually.
These arguments were based on the interpretation of the planned economy as a "system of bargaining." 7) Under state socialism the plan guided the flow of inputs and outputs of production. The planner wanted more output out of less input whereas the manager wanted the opposite. This generated the plan bargaining, through which the plan targets were determined. Because fulfillment of the targets was the most important criterion of success for the firm, the manager bargained with the planner for a loose plan that could be easily fulfilled. And, the manager concealed information, underestimated his plant's capacity and even held back production because future targets were dependent on present actual performance (the "ratchet principle"). The same logic created the labor shortage in the planned economy.
Managers hoarded labor because labor reserve was an effective hedge against uncertainties such as an abrupt increase in plan targets and supply delays which were inherent in the planned economy. The attempt to meet plan targets necessitated some periods of intensive labor, i.e. "storming." Labor shortage, competition among workers for additional labor reserves and official commitment to full employment made it possible for the workers to increase their bargaining power vis-a-vis managers. The size of labor force was critical to the manager who had political and economic ambition. His income was also dependent on the size of the wage fund at his plant. The failure of Shchekino experiment aimed to reduce the overmanning could be explained by these managerial behaviors; they resisted surrendering their labor reserves. 10) To conceal information from the planner, the manager needed cooperation on the part of the workers. Moreover, the continuous reorganization of the labor process generated by supply shortages allowed a good deal of bargaining power to the workers, particularly the skilled workers. 11) "Shop-floor politics" scholars found a variety of individualized outlet of workers' discontents in communist society, for example, labor turnover, absenteeism, alcoholism, informal bargaining over norms, and participation in the second economy. The style of industrial organization was tolerant of these individual forms of "deviance" that acted as safety-values. 12) Thus, the lack 9) Janois Kornai (1986) ( the Soviet Union even after the extensive industrialization and the end of Stalinist oppression. In short, the question remains unresolved: why did the Polish workers frequently turn to intense strikes whereas the Soviet workers did not? Our analysis needs to go beyond the boundary of the micro-level "shop-floor politics."
Economic Fluctuations in the Planned Economy
In spite of communist regime's official denial, economic fluctuation in 
Economic Performance of the Brezhnev regime
The Brezhnev regime reduced the gap between workers' expectation and the actual level of consumption. On the one hand, the Brezhnev leadership reduced the consumer expectation generated by Khrushchev's slogans such as 
A Vicious Cycle in Poland
The distinctive feature of the Polish strike experience was its pattern of cyclical repetition. First of all, it should be noted that Polish labor strikes were concentrated only in certain period (in 1956, 1970-71, 1976 and 1980) ; except for these periods, Poland experienced no more than the number of strikes ("a few dozen" a year) which occurred in the Soviet Union. 22) Second, the immediate causes of all four intense and nationwide labor protests were announcements of sharp restrictions on workers' real consumption; three of them (in 1970, 1976, 1980) were caused by steep increases in the prices of consumer goods, mainly foods; the other (in 1956) was caused by regime's plan to raise the work norm, which also would adversely affect workers' real wage. Third, in the above four cases, all announced price increases or norm changes were subsequently cancelled by the regime within a very short time 27) Average annual growth rates in national income already began to fall from 8.6 between 1951 and 1955 to 6.5 between 1956 and 1960 and 6.2 between 1961 and 1965 . Ian Shapiro (1981 artificially increase consumption, along with a fall in investment growth.
As the regime was consolidated, Gomulka pursued a basically autarkic anti-consumption policy. The rate of accumulation became "even higher than Table 1. 32) Where the share of expenditure for food and other basic consumer goods is too large in comparison with total personal income and the shortage of those goods is also great, the large portion of the increased income is usually spent to those goods and thereby exacerbates the existing level of shortage unless the supply of those goods increases sharply. Compare the inflation rates of 4.7 to 8.7 percent since the mid-1970s with those of -1.2, and 0.00 percent in 1971 and 1972, respectively.
33) Ian Shapiro (1981), p. 475. eventually depleted the fiscal capacity. 34) In sum, from the mid-1970s, the gap between workers' consumption expectations and regime's capacity to satisfy it became wider than ever due to the depletion of government's fiscal capacity.
In order to check these developments, Gierek began to reverse his industrial strategy. First of all, Gierek attempted to deflate domestic consumer demand by sharply increasing retail prices of basic consumer goods as well as by reducing imports. In 1976, it was withdrawn within 24 hours after strikes occurred. Then, the regime had to accord priority to consumption over investment between 1976 and 1979; the average growth rate of consumption was artificially maintained higher than that of investment. 
Comparison
The above findings can be summarized; (1) Consequently, the impact of the price increases on the worker's real 36) Janet G. Chapman (1979) consumption was severe. Moreover, because of a rigid and artificial price system, price increases, whenever implemented, tended to be very sharp 38) and accordingly their psychological impact was very great. Furthermore, in communist societies price increases motivated almost everyone as a consumer to act collectively for a public good i.e. cancellation of the increase whereas food shortage usually made consumers compete against one another. 39) Therefore, strikes caused by price increases were the most intense. In short, the fiscal capacity of government to sustain food subsidies played a decisive role in maintaining communist regime's stability.
The two countries differ greatly in this respect. With relatively sound fiscal capacity, the Soviet Union could avoid the nationwide price increases that occurred in Poland, though there were chronic food shortages and, from time to time, the shortages were exacerbated in certain regions, peripheral regions in particular.
In order to maintain a sound fiscal capacity, it was necessary for communist governments to avoid generating excessive demand while securing a relatively stable and balanced growth in investment and consumption. The
Brezhnev regime achieved a "steady" growth of workers' real consumption, which allowed the regime to avoid excessive demand for consumer goods while at the same time satisfying worker's expectation. In contrast, Poland experienced severe fluctuations in investment and consumption rates, which 38) In Poland, magnitude of price hike was from 30 to 100 percent. See Wladyslaw Majkowski (1985) , pp. 75-77.
39) According to J. M. Montias, impact of price increases on the semi-skilled and skilled workers was almost the same as that of a comparable deterioration of good shortage. That is, the poor people were the main victims. Thus, he argued that the impact of price increases on the leading group of workers was mainly psychological. J. M. Montias (1981) "Observation on Strikes, Riots and Other Disturbances," in Jan F. Triska and Charles Gati (eds.), p. 180. In addition, because price increases, unlike shortage of supply, deprived the low income earners of the opportunity to buy goods that they had bought in the past and some people could still buy them, it made low income earners more keenly aware of inequalities.
increasingly widened the gap between workers' expectation and the regime's capacity to deliver consumer goods 40) and periodically necessitated the sharp downfall of workers' real consumption by steep increases in consumer goods.
In sum, Polish workers' militancy was raised by the fluctuations in worker's consumption levels i.e. periodical announcement of sharp reductions of workers' real consumption after a relatively long period of ("steady" in 1960s
or "sharp" in 1970s) rising expectations which were stimulated by the regime's propaganda and/or economic growth.
Conclusion
The present study explained the difference in labor militancy between the Soviet Union and Poland by examining causes and patterns of labor strikes in the two countries. Instead of attributing the difference in labor militancy between the two countries to the different conditions of "shop-floor politics," this study employed a strategy of a macro-level approach to labor strikes, and examined the association of strikes with fluctuations in workers' real consumption. On this basis, this paper attempted to capture the nature of the "social contract" between the regime and labor in the communist state.
The main arguments of this paper can be summarized as follows. The primary cause of the difference in labor militancy between the two countries lies in different degrees of fluctuations in the workers' real consumption.
Frustration of rising expectation such as sharp downfall of worker's real wage repeatedly led directly to regime-labor confrontations in Poland. In contrast, expectation among workers and by maintaining a stable increase in workers' consumption at the national level.
We see the two sets of identities in communist society i.e. the identity of state-employer-income redistributor on the one hand and the identity of citizen-employee-consumer on the other hand. Because of this dichotomous structure, an occurrence of labor strike immediately signified the breakdown of social contract between the regime and labor, and therefore it was inherently very "political." That is, the responsibilities and failure of the state to deliver economic welfare became simply "transparent" to the workers and therefore economic issues were quickly transformed into political ones.
In both countries the primary cause of labor protests was the downfall of workers' real consumption. The factors of the capacity of trade union and the existence of active civil society were relatively constant variables in identifying causes of strikes in both countries; although there were always widespread workers' discontents with the trade unions or frustrated participation in management, even in Poland labor strikes were concentrated only in the periods of degeneration in the regime's economic performance.
The common experience as such in the two countries confirms that the legitimacy of communist rule was based mainly on the economic performance of the regime. As far as provision of economic welfare was acceptable, the workers accepted the rule of communist regime, at least implicitly. But, the downfall of workers' real consumption used to politicize the economic issues, making issues of economic inequality and nationalist sentiments more salient and thus leading to the breakdown of regime's legitimacy. In a nutshell, the higher level of workers' militancy in Poland was due to the lower level of the Polish regime's economic performance i.e. the failure to keep the "social contract." As a corollary, the labor quiescence continued in the Soviet Union thanks to the regime's capacity to provide the workers with economic security and steady increase in the standard of living, particularly during the Brezhnev leadership.
The above discussions support the "social contract" perspective. But, the "social contract" perspective, as a variant of relative deprivation theory, has the problem that reduces the complex process of workers' collective action simply to the actual or expected downfall of living standards. Nevertheless, it seems to be particularly useful in highlighting the "cyclical pattern" of the Polish workers' spontaneous strikes that the conventional "civil society" argument fails to explain. Further analysis on the subsequent development of Solidarity, which is beyond the aim of this paper, requires comprehensive research on the political opportunities, resource mobilization and framing process, as social movement literature suggests. 
